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Hegel,  Reason,  and  Idealism 
 
Philip  J.  Kain 
Santa  Clara  University 
 
 
In  this  article  I  want  to  focus  on  the  central  role  that  scienti c  reason  plays,  for  Hegel, 
in  leading  us  toward  idealism,  yet  its  complete  failure  to  adequately  establish  idealism, 
and,  oddly  enough,  the  way  in  which  this  failure  turns  into  a  most  interesting  success  by 
anchoring  idealism  and  thus  preserving  us  from  solipsism.   To  bring  all  of  this  into  relief, 
I  must  attend  to  Hegel's  di erences  with  Kant. 
 
I. 
A  major  concern  of  Hegel's  philosophy  is  to  decide  the  place,  importance,  and  scope 
of  reason  ( Vernunft  ).   Grand  claims  have  traditionally  been  made  on  its  behalf--that  it  is 
the  highest  form  of  knowledge  and  that  it  is  capable  of  knowing  everything  that  can  be 
known.   In  the  early  modern  period,  this  sort  of  commitment  even  launched  natural 
science's  quest  to  demonstrate  that  reason  is,  as  Hegel  puts  it,  all  of  reality.     Even  Kant 
1
would  admit  that  reason,  as  long  as  it  does  not  go  beyond  experience  (in  which  case  it 
produces  transcendental  illusion),  as  long  as  it  con nes  its  operation  to  the  realm  of 
observation  and  experience,  can  lead  us  toward  solid  empirical  knowledge  of  everything 
1 Notes 
 
   Phenomenology  of  Spirit   (hereafter  PhS  ),  trans.  A.V.  Miller  (Oxford: 
Clarendon  Press,  1977),  140  and,  for  the  German,  Gesammelte  Werke,   ed. 
Rheinisch-Westfälischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  (Hamburg:   Felix  Meiner,  1968 
 .),  IX,  133. 
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that  can  be  known.     There  is  nothing  unusual  here--this  is  the  traditional  sort  of  claim 
2
made  by  theoretical  reason. 
But  all  of  this  overlooks  a  real  problem--and  Hegel  zeroes  right  in  on  it.   Theoretical 
reason,  certainly  as  understood  by  Kant,  cannot   make  good  on  its  grand  claims.   Hegel 
thinks  that  we  cannot  hold  both  that:   (1)  self-consciousness  constructs  all  of  reality 
within  the  transcendental  unity  of  self-consciousness,  and  (2)  that  theoretical  reason  can 
give  us  knowledge  of  all  things  in  the  world.   Scienti c  knowledge,  empirical 
observational  knowledge--theoretical  reason  as  traditionally  understood  and  as 
understood  by  Kant--will  not  even  allow  us  to  take  the  most  basic  step.   It  will  not  allow 
us  to  understand  the  transcendental  self  that  constructs  our  world  and  does  the  knowing. 
Kant  himself  would  admit  this  openly,  though  he  would  not  seem  to   nd  it  the 
embarrassment  that  Hegel  suggests  it  is.   But  further  than  this,  Hegel  will  argue,  scienti c 
reason  will  not  even  give  us  an  adequate  empirical  understanding  of  the  self--the  sort   of 
understanding  promised  by  empirical  psychology--as  Kant  certainly  thinks  it  can. 
Thus,  it  is  Hegel's  view  that  theoretical  reason  will  fail  miserably  in  its  claim  to  know 
all  of  reality.   Reason,  as  Lauer  puts  it,  has  been  engaged  in  a  "rational  conquest  of  the 
world.…  ",  it  has  "eliminated  all  other  contenders--myth,  faith,  authority,  tradition  …  "  
3
As  Hegel  puts  it,  reason  "plants  the  symbol  of  its  sovereignty  on  every  height  and  in 
every  depth  .…  [it]  digs  into  the  very  entrails  of  things  and  opens  every  vein  in  them  so 
that  it  may  gush  forth  to  meet  itself  …  "     But  reason's  conquest  will  not  succeed. 
4
Nevertheless,  I  will  try  to  argue,  its  failure  serves  a  very  important  function.   Its  failure 
will  shore  up  idealism.   The  fact  that  reason  is  unable  to  know  everything,  unable  to  pull 
every  last  bit  of  reality  into  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception,  this  failure 
permanently  prevents  a  collapse  into  solipsism.   Theoretical  reason  confronts  a  solid  and 
irreducible  other  in  its  world  that  it  cannot  totally  absorb.   
2    I.  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason   (hereafter  CPR  ),  A297-B356,  B380-A324, 
A326-A327,  B436,  A644-B673,  A653-B682;  I  have  used  the  N.  Kemp  Smith  translation 
(New  York:   St.  Martin's  Press,  1965)  and,  for  the  German,  Kant's  gesammelte  Schriften, 
ed.  Königlich  Preussischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  (Berlin:   Georg  Reimer,  1910 
 .),  but  simply  cite  the  standard  A  and  B  edition  pagination  so  that  any  edition  may  be 
used.   Both  Kant  and  Hegel  distinguish  between  reason  ( Vernunft  )  and  understanding 
( Verstand  );  see  The  Logic  of  Hegel   (hereafter  L  ),  trans.  W.  Wallace  (Oxford:   Oxford 
University  Press,  1968),  92-3  and,  for  the  German,  Sämtliche  Werke,   ed.  H.  Glockner 
(Stuttgart:   Frommann,  1927   .),  VIII,  134.   While  Kant  makes  it  sound  as  if  reason  and 
understanding  are  actually  two  distinct  faculties,  it  would  seem  merely  that  when  we 
apply  categories  or  concepts  to  intuition,  we  have  understanding;  whereas  if  we  apply  the 
same  categories  or  concepts  either  beyond  experience  or  to  the  activities  of  the 
understanding  itself,  then  we  have  reason;  see  CPR   B356-B357,  B359,  B362-B363. 
Rather  than  two  distinct  faculties,  then,  it  would  seem  that  we  merely  have  a  di erence  in 
scope  and  in  the  sorts  of  objects  to  which  we  apply  our  thinking.   As  we  shall  see,  this 
will  certainly  be  Hegel's  tendency.  
3    Q.  Lauer,  S.J.,  A  Reading  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit   (New  York: 
Fordham  University  Press,  1976),  132-3.   
4    PhS,   146  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  138.  
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Hyppolite  says  that  Hegel  "rejects  a  purely  mathematical  conception  of  nature  like 
Newton's  …  But  he  also  rejects  Schelling's  and  Goethe's  view  of  nature  as  a  manifestation 
of  genuine  reason.   Reason,  which  observes  and  which  seeks  itself,  in  part  discovers  itself 
in  nature,  but  only  in  part.  "     In  other  words,  nature  is  not  radically  other  than 
5
consciousness--we  have  no  unknown  thing-in-itself  for  Hegel.   Yet  nature  is  not  simply 
and  wholly  within  consciousness,  say,  as  for  Berkeley.   For  Hegel,  we  have  an  objective 
idealism.   Nature  is  within  consciousness,  but  it  is  not  wholly  comprehended  by 
consciousness.   It  is  not  completely  dissolved  into  consciousness.   Within  consciousness, 
it  always  remains  an  object  over  against  consciousness.   Reason   nds  itself  in  nature,  but 
nature  is  not  nothing  but  reason;  and  reason  cannot  be  fully  at  home  in  nature.   In  the 
Logic,   Hegel  says,  "The  aim  of  knowledge  is  to  divest  the  objective  world  that  stands 
opposed  to  us  of  its  strangeness,  and,  as  the  phrase  is,  to   nd  ourselves  at  home  in  it: 
which  means  no  more  than  to  trace  the  objective  world  back  to  the  notion,--to  our 
innermost  self."     The  natural  world  has  to  be  worked  on.   It  must  be  transformed.   It  must 
6
be  understood.   We   nd  this  drive  to  alter,  this  drive  to  strip  things  of  their  foreignness, 
Hegel  says  in  the  Aesthetics,   in  something  as  simple  as  a  child  skipping  stones  in  a  river 
as  well  as  all  the  way  up  to  art,  religion,  and  philosophy.     Natural  science  is  part  of  this 
7
same  drive  to  remove  the  foreignness  of  things,  an  attempt  to  allow  us  to  see  ourselves  in 
the  world  and  be  at  home  in  it,  but  it  is  not  spirit  and  will  not  succeed  to  the  extent  that 
art,  religion,  and  philosophy  can. 
Hegel's  idealism  is  a  robust,  subtle,  and  very  interesting  idealism.   It  is  quite  di erent 
from  other  forms  of  idealism.   All  of  reality,  for  Hegel,  is  within  consciousness,  but  the 
object  is  not  just  an  object  of  perception,  and  thus  we  need  not  deny  that  it  is  actually  out 
there,  as  for  Berkeley.   Objects  really  are  out  there  for  Hegel.     Hegel's  view,  we  might 
8
say,  is  that  their  esse  es  intelligi.    The  essence  of  the  thing,  what  it  most  truly  is,  is  what 
reason  knows   about  it.   This  in  no  way  requires  the  rejection  of  actual  objects  or  things. 
Take,  for  example,  the  concept  of  matter.    Hegel  is  fully  able  to  accept  the  existence  of 
matter.   It  is  just  that  in  discussing  what  we  know  about  matter,  what  matter  really  is, 
Hegel  is  going  to  end  up  putting  the  emphasis  on  the  concept   of  matter,  where  the 
materialist  will  put  all  the  emphasis  simply  on  the  matter.       Hegel  does  not  need  to  deny 
9
that  there  is  something  out  there.    It  is  just  that  as  soon  as  we  try  to  get  clear  about  what 
we  know  or  understand  about  the  thing  out  there  we  cannot  avoid  the  idealist  turn.   We 
5    J.  Hyppolite,  Genesis  and  Structure  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit ,   trans. 
S.  Cherniak  and  J.  Heckman  (Evanston,  IL:   Northwestern  University  Press,  1974),  244 
(my  italics). 
6    L,   335  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  404-5).   See  also  Hegel's  Philosophy  of 
Right,   trans.  T.M.  Knox  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press,  1952),  12  and,  for  the  German, 
Sämtliche  Werke,   VII,  35.  
7    Aesthetics:   Lectures  on  Fine  Art,   trans.  T.M.  Knox   (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press, 
1975),  I,  31  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   XII,  58. 
8    Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Mind   (hereafter  PM  ),  trans.  W.  Wallace  (Oxford: 
Clarendon  Press,  1971),  198  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  323. 
9    PhS,   154  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  144.  
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begin  to  conceptualize--that  is,  to  idealize.   And  only  thus  do  we  really  know  the  thing. 
All  that  we  know  about  the  thing,  what  it  really  is,  its  essence,  is  ideal. 
The  di erence  between  Hegel  and  Kant,  then,  is  really  a  very  subtle  matter  of 
emphasis.   For  Kant  there  is  a  thing-in-itself  out  there  that  we  cannot  know.   Hegel  does 
not  reject  this  thing-in-itself.   He  just  thinks  that  Kant  has  not  thought  it  through  very 
well.   Hegel  accepts  the  thing-in-itself  as  much  as  Kant  does.   Hegel  is  just  perplexed  at 
how  anyone  could  accept  the  concept  of  a  thing-in-itself,  accept  it  exactly  as  Kant  does, 
and  then  claim  not  to  know  it.    The  only  thing  Kant  could  possibly  mean,  Hegel  thinks,  is 
that  we  cannot  know  the  content,  the  speci cs,  the   lling  of  this  concept  of  the 
thing-in-itself.   Because  we  certainly  know  the  concept  of  the  thing  in  itself--  we  talk 
about  it,  employ  it,  argue  about  it  page  after  page.   And  that  is  exactly  what  the 
thing-in-itself  is,  merely  a  concept,  merely  a  concept  of  an  empty,  contentless,  thing--and 
nothing  else.   There  simply  is  no  content  there  to  be  known.   But  what  is   there,  the  bare 
concept,  is  obviously  and  easily  known.  
10
Hegel's  rejection  of  the  notion  that  the  thing-in-itself  is  unknown  leads  to  a 
fundamental  di erence  between  his  idealism  and  Kant's.   For  Hegel,  reason  grasps  the 
essence  of  things,  their  very  reality,  "self-consciousness  and  being  are  the  same  essence, 
the  same,  not  through  comparison,  but  in  and  for  themselves."    Hegel  thinks  it  a 
11
spurious  idealism  that  lets  this  unity  split  into  consciousness  on  one  side  and  the  in-itself 
on  the  other.   Hegel  wants  to  move  beyond  Kant  and  to  recapture  the  direct  grasp  of 
reality  characteristic  of  traditional  metaphysics.   
12
Reason,  we  must  see,  is  not  merely  a  subjective  phenomena--a  characteristic  activity 
or  process  of  minds.   Reason,  for  Hegel,  is  also  objective.   Reason  expects  to   nd  itself  in 
nature.   The  object  embodies  reason.   Our  subjective  reason  wants  to  meet  reason  in  the 
object  so  as  to  be  at  one  with  it.   This  is  a  view  that  one  can   nd  in  Medieval  and 
Renaissance  thought  and  which  Hegel  wants  to  revive  in  a  modern  form.   For  Aquinas, 
reason  was  embedded  in  the  objective  world  by  God  in  the  form  of  natural  law.     If  we 
13
were  to  imagine  this  traditional  conception  of  God  replaced  by  an  absolute  transcendental 
unity  of  consciousness,  then  nature  would  not  lie  outside  this  absolute  consciousness,  but 
would  be  constituted  within  it.   The  di erence,  then,  between  our  individual 
consciousness  and  nature  (both  of  which  are  within  this  absolute  consciousness)  would 
not  be  a  radical  di erence  between  consciousness,  on  the  one  hand,  and  nature  or  matter, 
on  the  other.   There  are  not  two  worlds  here.   Rather  we  would  have  a  di erence  within 
consciousness--within  absolute  consciousness.   Thus,  to  say  that  nature  is  rational,  that  it 
obeys  rational  laws,  would  not  be  to  say  that  nature  is  neutral  material  out  there  and  that 
only  our  mind  subjectively  perceives  it  as  rational--that  the  rationality  is  only  in  our 
10    L ,   91-2  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  133.   PhS,   89,  103  and  Gesammelte  Werke, 
IX,  90,  102.   
11    PhS,   142  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  134.  
12    L,   60-1  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  99-100.   PhS,   142,  146-7  and  Gesammelte 
Werke,   IX,  134,  138. 
13    For  example,  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa  Theologiae,   1st  Part  of  2nd  Part, 
Question  91,  Article  2,  pp.  22-3;  I  have  used  the  New  York:   McGraw-Hill,  1964  edition 
but  cite  the  part,  question,  and  article  so  that  any  edition,  English  or  Latin,  may  be  used. 
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minds.   Rationality  would  permeate  nature  itself.   Nature  would  be  a  part  of  an  absolute 
rational  consciousness.   It  would  be  inseparable  from  rationality.   So  our  subjective 
rationality  can  and  must  grasp  objective  rationality  in  the  natural  object. 
In  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,   there  is  a  section  entitled,  "Refutation  of 
Idealism."     It  will  be  instructive  to  compare  this  section  to  Hegel's  very   rm  a rmation 
14
of  idealism.   Kant  distinguishes  between  the  problematic  idealism  of  Descartes,  which 
holds  that  the  existence  of  objects  in  space  outside  us  is  merely  doubtful  and 
indemonstrable,  and  the  dogmatic  idealism  of  Berkeley,  which  holds  that  space  itself  is 
false  and  impossible.     Kant  wants  to  deny  that  he  is  an  idealist  of  either  sort.   He  wants 
15
to  refute  idealism.   And  so  he  argues  against  both  Descartes  and  Berkeley  that  inner 
experience  is  only  possible  on  the  assumption  of  outer  experience.   Kant  argues  that  he  is 
conscious  of  his  own  existence  as  determined  in  time.   But  all  determination  of  time  (the 
 ux  of  inner  experience),  Kant  argues,  presupposes  something  permanent.   We  are  only 
able  to  perceive  determination  of  time  through  change,  and  we  can  only  perceive  change 
against  the  background  of  something  unchanging  or  permanent.   Without  a  permanent, 
then,  we  would  not  be  able  to  perceive  change  in  any  ordered  way--as  we  obviously  do 
perceive  it.   So,  for  example,  prisoners  kept  in  the  dark  for  long  periods  of  time  have  no 
permanent  against  which  to  order  temporal  change  and  thus  lose  all  sense  of  time.   Such 
experience  can  be  extremely  disorienting.   Where,  then,  can  we   nd  this  necessary 
permanent?   Certainly  not  in  inner  sense--which  is  nothing  but  a  continual  Humean   ux. 
A  permanent  is  possible,  then,  Kant  concludes,  "only  through  a  thing   outside  me  and  not 
through  the  mere  representation   of  a  thing  outside  me  …  "     Thus  Kant  is  not  an  idealist 
16
of  the  Cartesian  or  Berkeleyan  sort.   He  is  an  empirical  realist.   The  empirical  world 
really  exists  out  there  in  outer  sense.   
All  of  this,  however,  will  not  clear  Kant  of  the  charge  of  idealism,  certainly  not  as 
soon  as  we  realize  that  for  him  the  empirical  world  of  outer  sense  is  our  construction,  an 
appearance--a  representation.    And  so  we  still  need  something  out  there  more  than  just 
this  representation.   There  must,  it  would  seem,  be  an  unknown  thing-in-itself  out  there 
beneath  the  representation.   Besides  being  an  empirical  realist,  Kant  is  a  transcendental 
idealist.   
17
In  Hegel's  view,  Kant  has  certainly  not  refuted  idealism.   Kant  is   an  idealist.   And  the 
fact  that  Kant  claims  to  be  a  transcendental  idealist  while  remaining  an  empirical  realist, 
in  Hegel's  opinion,  just  lands  Kant  in  a  spurious  form  of  idealism.     In  this  form  of 
18
idealism,  Hegel  says,  reason   rst  claims  that  all  reality  is  its  own--that  all  is  within  the 
transcendental  unity  of  apperception.   But  all  this  gives  us  is  an  empty  'mine'--a  sheer 
empty  unity  of  self-consciousness.   And  thus  for  this  empty  'mine'  to  get  any   lling,  for  it 
to  get  a  world,  it  will  at  the  same  time  have  to  be  an  absolute  empiricism.   Where  Kant 
14    CPR,   B274-B279. 
15    Hegel,  in  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,   holds  that  "things  are  in  truth  themselves 
spatial  and  temporal  …  ";  PM,   198  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  323. 
16    CPR,   B274-B276  (Kant's  italics),  A106-A107. 
17    CPR,   A368-A370,  A375,  A385. 
18    PhS,   142  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  134. 
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argues  that  transcendental  realism  leads  to  empirical  idealism,    Hegel  argues  that 
19
transcendental  idealism  leads  to  absolute  empiricism.   To  get  any   lling--to  get  hold  of 
di erence,  multiplicity,  a  world--will  require  an  extraneous  impulse.   It  must  come  from 
an  outside  source--an  unknown  thing-in-itself.   Where  else  could  the   lling  come  from? 
It  cannot  be  generated  by  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  itself.   And  so  all 
reality  is  not  really  'mine.'   Moreover,  Hegel  argues,  in  such  empiricism,  reason  will  only 
be  able  to  achieve  the  kind  of  knowing  that  we   nd  in  sensation,  perception,  and 
understanding,  that  is,  the  apprehending  of  an  extraneous  other  through  observation  or 
experience.   Such  knowing,  however,  is  not  a  true  knowing--by  the  very  standards  of  this 
idealism  itself.   True  knowing  is  only  possible  within  the  unity  of  apperception--the 
'mine.'    
20
This  spurious  idealism,  then,  ends  up  with  a  duality  of  opposed  factors--the  unity  of 
apperception  and  an  extraneous  impulse  or  unknown  thing-in-itself.   And  reason  is 
fundamentally  unable  to  bring  these  two  sides  together.   The  transcendental  unity  of 
apperception  cannot  give  itself  any   lling;  it  cannot  provide  a  world--the  multiplicity  and 
di erence  of  sensation.   And  the  kind  of  knowing  that  perceives  and  understands  the 
empirical  world,  we  shall  see,  is  incapable  of  knowing  the  transcendental  self.   To   nd 
itself  in  the  world,  to  succeed  as  natural  science,  then,  reason  must  lose  its  true  self,  the 
unity  of  apperception,  because  it  reduces  itself  to  the  knowing  of  observation,  perception, 
understanding,  a  form  of  knowing  incapable  of  grasping  the  transcendental  self,  and, 
moreover,  a  form  of  knowing  which  if  directed  toward  the  self  will  be  radically 
reductive--ultimately,  we  shall  see,  it  will  reduce  mind  to  a  mere  skull  bone.   Such 
knowing,  then,  fails  to  know  all   of  reality--it  fails  to  make  all  its  own.   It  fails  even  to 
know  itself.   This  is  deeply  ironic  because  it  was,  we  could  fairly  say,  the  commitment  to 
the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  the  'mine,'  the  notion  that  all  reality  was  its  own  and  thus 
was  knowable,  that  drove  reason  to  the  scienti c  project  in  the   rst  place,  to  the  attempt 
to  systematically  know  all  of  reality.   Yet  such  scienti c  knowing  fails  to  grasp,  reduces, 
destroys  the  very  unity  of  self-consciousness  that  set  it  going  in  the   rst  place. 
Kant  himself  admits  that  understanding,  the  sort  of  knowing  that  employs  the 
categories,  cannot  grasp  the  unity  of  apperception,  "Apperception  is  itself  the  ground  of 
the  possibility  of  the  categories  …  it  does  not   know  itself  through  the  categories,   but 
knows  the  categories,  and  through  them  all  objects,  in  the  absolute  unity  of  apperception, 
and  so  through  itself.    Now  it  is,  indeed,  very  evident  that  I  cannot  know  as  an  object  that 
which  I  must  presuppose  in  order  to  know  any  object  …"     Hegel  thinks  that  the  inability 
21
of  this  self  (which  makes  all  knowing  possible)  to  know  itself  is  an  embarrassment. 
Indeed  he  thinks  that  such  knowing--scienti c  knowing,  observation,  experience--does 
not  know  what  knowing  really  is. 
The  thrust  of  Kant's  thought,  then,  is  to   ee  idealism,  to  be  embarrassed  by  it,  to   nd 
an  other,  a  permanent,  a  thing-in-itself,  an  anchor--as  if  he  were  afraid  of  being  trapped 
and  imprisoned  in  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception.   Hegel  moves  in  precisely  the 
opposite  direction.   He  a rms  idealism.   He  even  thinks  that  reason,  ordinary  reason, 
19    CPR,   A369. 
20    PhS,   144-5  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  136-7. 
21    CPR,   A401-A402  (Kant's  italics). 
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reason  as  understood  by  the  scienti c  tradition,  as  well  as  by  Kant,  if  we  watch  it 
carefully,  despite  what  it  takes  itself  to  be  doing,  really  moves  us  in  Hegel's  own 
direction.   Scienti c  reason,  "approaches  things  in  the  belief  that  it  truly  apprehends  them 
as  sensuous  things  opposite  to  the  'I';  but  what  it  actually  does,  contradicts  this  belief,  for 
it  apprehends  them  intellectually,   it  transforms  their  sensuous  being  into  [concepts],  i.e. 
into  just  that  kind  of  being  which  is  at  the  same  time  'I',  hence  transforms  thought  into  the 
form  of  being,  or  being  into  the  form  of  thought;  it  maintains,  in  fact,  that  it  is  only  as 
[concepts]  that  things  have  truth."   
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Reason  seeks  laws--scienti c  laws,  laws  of  nature--and  that  means,  for  Hegel,  that  it 
seeks  conceptions,  abstractions,  which  replace  the  independent,  indi erent,  subsistence  of 
sensuous  reality.   As  Hegel  puts  it  in  the  Logic,   "the  positive  reality  of  the  world  must  be 
as  it  were  crushed  and  pounded,  in  other  words,  idealized."     In  the  Philosophy  of  Mind, 
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he  says,  "Every  activity  of  mind  is  nothing  but  a  distinct  mode  of  reducing  what  is 
external  to  the  inwardness  which  mind  itself  is,  and  it  is  only  by  this  reduction,  by  this 
idealization  or  assimilation,  of  what  is  external  that  it  becomes  and  is  mind.…  This 
material,  in  being  seized  by  the  'I',  is  at  the  same  time  poisoned  and  trans gured  by  the 
latter's  universality;  it  loses  its  isolated,  independent  existence  and  receives  a  spiritual 
one."    
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For  example,  by  testing  a  law  thru  experiment,  one  might  think  that  the  independent, 
external,  and  sensible  would  be  established  against  the  abstract  and  conceptual--that  the 
conceptual  law  would  be  overwhelmed,  lost,  in  the  gritty  particularity  and  multiplicity  of 
the  sensible.   One  might  think  that  we  would  come  to  the  empirical  and  particular  rather 
than  to  the  conceptual.   But  really,  Hegel  argues,  exactly  the  opposite  occurs.   Sense 
existents  are  lost  in  the  conceptual.   The  conceptual  law  is  brought  out  in  its  abstract 
shape.   Speci c  existence,  speci c  cases,  are  established  as  cases  of  the  conceptual  law. 
The  same  abstract  law  is  seen  to  have  many  speci c  instances  and  these  instances  are 
conceived  as  instances-of-the-abstract-law.     Moreover,  natural  science  even  uni es 
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particular  laws  under  higher  level  and  more  general  laws--for  example,  the  law  of 
planetary  motion  and  the  law  of  terrestrial  motion  under  the  law  of  gravity.   The 
independent  subsistence  of  the  sensuous  particular  tends  to  vanish;  it  tends  to  become  an 
instance  of  higher  and  higher  level  conceptual  laws.   
Kant,  then,  wanted  to  refute  idealism  by  showing  us  that  inner  sense  required 
something  really  out  there,  a  permanent,  and  not  just  the  representation  of  a  permanent, 
but,  it  would  seem,  a  thing-in-itself.   Thus  Kant  is  an  empirical  realist.   The  empirical 
world  really  is  out  there.   But  he  is  also  a  transcendental  idealist  because  we  cannot  know 
things  as  they  are  in-themselves.   Hegel  rejects  this  refutation  of  idealism.   He  rejects  the 
Kantian  notion  that  knowledge  is  ever  going  to  hand  us  a  permanent  really  out  there--if 
'out  there'  means  anything  like  independent  of  our  knowing.   Knowledge  is  not  even 
22    PhS,   147  (Hegel's  italics;  and  translation  altered)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX, 
138. 
23    L,   88  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  129.   Also  PhS,   146-7  and  Gesammelte 
Werke,   IX,  138.  
24    PM,   11  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  24-5. 
25    PhS,   152-3  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  143-4. 
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going  to  steer  us  in  that  direction.   Knowing  does  not  direct  us  beyond  itself.   It  does  the 
very  opposite--it  appropriates,  conquers,  trans gures,  crushes  and  pounds,  in  short,  it 
idealizes.   Even  scienti c  knowledge,  which  at   rst  sight  seems  to  be  a  paradigm  case  of 
knowing  that  con rms  ordinary  consciousness's  belief  in  the  objective,  sensuous, 
external,  material  world,  Hegel  shows  us,  really  moves  in  the  opposite  direction.   It 
idealizes.   It  con rms  idealism--it  does  not  refute  it. 
 
II. 
At  this  point,  we  have  to  wonder  whether  Hegel's  idealism  can  avoid  solipsism. 
Hegel  eliminates  all  external  anchors.   He  refuses  to  appeal  to  an  outside,  to  an  unknown 
thing-in-itself,  as  Kant  did,  or  even  to  a  transcendent  God,  as  for  Berkeley.   For  Hegel,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  thing-in-itself  is  known  and,  as  we  can  see  elsewhere,  God  is  our 
construction.     Even  matter  gets  idealized.   There  is  nothing,  then,  but  consciousness  and 
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its  objects.   There  is  no  outside--everything  is  inside.   How,  then,  do  we  avoid  an 
implosion  into  solipsism?   If  reality  is  to  be  shored  up,  it  is  clear  that  it  can  only  be  shored 
up  immanently.   But  how?   What  is  left  to  make  this  inside  solid  and  real?   Appeal  to 
authority?   Can  we  argue  that  all  is  real  because  science  can  study  it,  understand  it, 
control  it,   nd  it  useful?   Is  there  nothing  more  than  the  o cial  imprimatur  of  science  to 
shore  up  reality  from  inside.   
There  is  a  bit  more  to  it  than  this.   It  is  true  that  scienti c  reason  has  an  idealizing 
tendency,  but  not  only  will  it  never  lead  us  into  solipsism,  it  will  permanently  block  such 
a  consequence.   Scienti c  reason  idealizes,  but  it  is  incapable  of  fully  and  adequately 
idealizing  what  confronts  it,  and  this  is  so  because  reason  also  objecti es.   This  is 
especially  obvious  when  reason  turns  to  itself,  to  mind.   At  this  level,  as  we  shall  see, 
reason  is  a  total  failure.   And  because  of  this  failure,  we  might  say,  scienti c  reason 
 nally  turns  out  to  be  the  hero  of  ordinary  consciousness.   It  gives  us,  guarantees  us,  a 
stable  world  of  objects  out  there  over  against  us.   It  prevents  solipsism--as  long  as  we 
stick  with  scienti c  reason  and  do  not  go  on  to  a  more  fully  developed  reason. 
Scienti c  reason  seeks  itself  in  the  world  through  observation,  experience, 
experiment.   Two  concepts  that  permeate  this  whole  quest,  and  that  reason  cannot  do 
without,  are  the  concepts  of  inner  and  outer.     In  seeking  itself  in  the  world,  reason 
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cannot   nd  itself  directly--it  cannot  confront  itself,  as  it  were,  face  to  face.   Rather,  it 
takes  reason  in  the  world  to  be  a  hidden  inner  that  in  some  way  expresses  itself  in  the 
outer.   It  is  only  the  outer  that  we  can  observe.   We  can  study  the  outer  consequences,  the 
deeds,  the  e ects  of  the  inner  and  then  seek  to  grasp  the  various  relations  as  laws.   These 
concepts,  in  Hegel's  opinion,  are  seriously   awed.   In  employing  them,  reason  will  fail  to 
 nd  itself  in  the  world  in  adequate  fashion. 
26    PhS,   138  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  131.   Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion,   ed.  P.C.  Hodgson,  trans.  R.F.  Brown,  P.C.  Hodgson,  J.M.  Stewart  (Berkeley: 
University  of  California  Press,  1984-87),  I,  295  and,  for  the  German,  Vorlesungen  über 
die  Philosophie  der  Religion,   ed.  W.  Jaeschke  (Hamburg,  Felix  Meiner,  1983),  I,  199. 
Also  see  note  62  below. 
27    We  also   nd  these  concepts  in  Kant,  even  in  his  "Refutation  of  Idealism; "  CPR, 
B339=A283,  B274-B278. 
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In  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology ,   Hegel  examines  reason's  attempt  to  study  and  to 
 nd  itself  in  inorganic  nature  and  then  in  organic  nature.   In  neither  case  does  reason   nd 
itself  adequately.   Reason  then  turns  directly  to  itself,  and  Hegel  explores  the  science  of 
empirical  psychology. 
As  we  have  seen,  for  Kant,  the  self  knows  whatever  it  knows  through  the  categories, 
but  cannot  know  itself  through  the  categories.     In  other  words,  the  inner  self  cannot  be 
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known  through  outer  experience.   As  Kant  puts  it,  "I  cannot  have  any  representation 
whatsoever  of  a  thinking  being,  through  any  outer  experience,  but  only  through 
self-consciousness."   However,  we  can  for  Kant  develop  an  empirical  psychology;  we  can 
make  "use  of  observations  concerning  the  play  of  our  thoughts  and  the  natural  laws  of  the 
thinking  self  to  be  derived  from  these  thoughts"  and  "there  would  arise  an  empirical 
psychology  …  capable  perhaps  of  explaining  the  appearances  of  inner  sense  …  "  
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Hegel  objects  to  all  of  this.   In  the   rst  place,  as  we  shall  see,  we  cannot  successfully 
separate  inner  from  outer.   In  the  second  place,  it  is  the  very  reliance  upon  a  form  of 
knowing  that  only  observes  outer  objects  and  actions,  namely,  scienti c  reason,  that  will 
guarantee  not  only  that  we  are  unable  to  grasp  directly  a  supposed  inner  self,  as  Kant 
admits,  but  will  also  keep  us  from  inferring  across  this  false  gap  from  outer  to  inner,  and 
thus  will  not  even  give  us  the  empirical  psychology  Kant  thinks  we  can  have. 
Hegel  argues  that  empirical  psychology  assumes,  on  the  one  hand,  an  already  given 
world  of  circumstances,  customs,  habits,  and  so  forth,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  mind 
simply  given  as  separate  and  as  containing  all  sorts  of  faculties,  inclinations,  passions,  "a 
contingent  medley  of  heterogeneous  beings  …  together  in  the  mind  like  things  in  a  bag 
…  "     Empirical  psychology,  then,  would  attempt  to  establish  the  laws  that  determine  the 
30
e ect  exerted  on  the  individual  mind  by  speci c  circumstances,  customs,  habits,  and  so 
forth.   
This  simply  will  not  work,  Hegel  argues,  because  individuals  both  conform  to 
circumstances  as  well  as  set  themselves  in  opposition  to  (and,  indeed,  even  transform) 
circumstances.   Therefore,  exactly  what  circumstances  are  to  a ect  the  individual  and 
what  kind  of  e ect  they  are  to  have  depends  very  much  upon  the  individual.   Of  course,  if 
these  circumstances,  customs,  the  general  "state  of  the  world,  had  not  been,  then  of 
course  the  individual  would  not  have  become  what  he  is",  but  the  fact  that  this  particular 
individual  was  particularized  in  this  speci c  way  implies  that  this  individual  must  have 
had  something  to  do  with  particularizing  itself  on  its  own  account.    
31
If  individuals  were  directly  and  simply  formed  by  the  world,  then  we  would  only  have 
to  study  the  world  to  understand  the  individual.   "We  should  have  a  double  gallery  of 
pictures,  one  of  which  would  be  the  re ection  of  the  other:   the  one,  the  gallery  of 
external  circumstances  [would]  completely  determine  and  circumscribe  the  individual, 
the  other"  would  be  "the  same  gallery  translated  into"  the  inner  individual.     This  is 
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obviously  unacceptable.   The  same  world  does  not  form  all  individuals  in  the  same  way. 
28    CPR,   A401-A402 ,  B422. 
29    CPR,   A347. 
30    PhS,   182  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  169. 
31    PhS,   183-4  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  170-1.  
32    PhS,   184  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  170. 
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Clearly,  the  world  does  have  an  a ect  on  the  individual,  but  the  world  that  has  this  e ect 
could  either  be  the  world  understood  as  it  is  in  and  for  itself  or  the  world  understood  as 
already  transformed  by  the  individual,  and  the  in uence  upon  the  individual  expected 
from  the  former  could  be  absolutely  the  opposite  of  that  actually  brought  about  by  the 
latter.   "The  result  of  this  …  is  that  'psychological  necessity'  becomes  an  empty  phrase,  so 
empty  that  there  exists  the  absolute  possibility  that  what  is  supposed  to  have  had  this 
in uence  could  just  as  well  not  have  had  it."   
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In  Hegel's  view,  we  are  in uenced  by  our  world.   But  the  world  cannot  be  understood 
as  something  existing  simply  in  and  for  itself  outside  and  apart  from  the  individual.   We 
must  see  that  the  world  is  transformed  by  the  individual.   Nor  can  we  understand  the 
individual  as  separate  from  the  world.   The  individual  is  formed  by  a  world  it  transforms. 
We  do  not  have  a  situation  that  falls  apart  into  a  world  as  given  and  an  individual  existing 
on  its  own  account.   If  we  insist  on  separating  world  and  individual,  as  scienti c  reason 
does,  then  we  will   nd  no  necessity  and  no  law  that  connects  them.      What  Hegel  wants 
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to  work  towards  is  a  rejection  of  the  distinction  between  inner  and  outer,  between 
individual  and  world.   We  must  get  beyond  the  sort  of  knowing  that  sets  objects  out  there, 
over  against  an  inner  self.   From  this  point  forward  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology , 
Hegel  launches  an  attack  on  all  separations  which  cluster  around,  or  are  versions  of,  the 
distinction  between  inner  and  outer. 
He  ends  up  examining  the  pseudoscience  of  phrenology.   Phrenology  as  propounded 
by  Gall  contended  that  the  individual's  character,  through  the  causal  e ect  of  mental 
processes  and  brain  functions,  produced  various  bumps  on  the  individual's  skull  which 
could  be  interpreted  by  the  phrenologist.   Hegel  writes, 
 
it  must  be  regarded  as  a  complete  denial  of  Reason  to  pass  o   a  bone  as  the  actual 
existence   of  consciousness;  and  it  is  passed  o   as  such  when  it  is  regarded  as  the 
outer  being  of  Spirit  …  It  is  no  use  saying  that  the  inner  is  only  being  inferred 
from  the  outer,  and  is  something  di erent,   nor  that  the  outer  is  not  the  inner  itself, 
but  only  its  expression.…  When  …  a  man  is  told  'You  (your  inner  being)  are  this 
kind  of  person  because  your  skull-bone  is  constituted  in  such  and  such  a  way,'  this 
means  nothing  else  than,  'I  regard  a  bone  as  your  reality'.    To  reply  to  such  a 
judgement  with  a  box  on  the  ear  …  the  retort  here  would,  strictly  speaking,  have 
to  go  the  length  of  beating  in  the  skull  of  anyone  making  such  a  judgement,  in 
order  to  demonstrate  in  a  manner  just  as  palpable  as  his  wisdom,  that  for  a  man,  a 
bone  is  nothing  in  itself,   much  less  his   true  reality.    
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Scienti c  reason  is  a  failure.   It  is  reductive  and  positivistic.   It  cannot  grasp  itself  in 
the  world.   It  is  inadequate  to  grasp  mind,  spirit,  consciousness.   If  it  tries,  Hegel's  point 
seems  to  be,  it  becomes  a  pseudoscience--it  reduces  mind  to  a  bone.   And  so  theoretical 
reason  must  "abandon  itself  and  do  a  right-about  turn."     Consciousness  must  cease  to  try 
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33    PhS,   184-5  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  171. 
34    PhS,   185  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  171. 
35    PhS,   205  (Hegel's  italics)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  188. 
36    PhS,   206  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  188. 
 
Hegel,  Reason,  and  Idealism 
to   nd  itself  as  immediately  given  in  the  world.   Instead  it  turns  to  practical  reason  and 
tries  to  "produce  itself  by  its  own  activity."   
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III. 
It  is  di cult  to  know  why  Hegel  takes  up  phrenology  as  the  example  he  uses  to 
demonstrate  the  failure  of  scienti c  reason.   But  to  better  understand  his  conception  of 
this  failure  it  will  be  instructive  to  compare  Hegel's  treatment  of  scienti c  reason  in  the 
Phenomenology   to  his  treatment  in  the  Encyclopaedia.    The  two  texts  are  very  di erent. 
In  the  latter  text,  it  is  not  at  all  the  case  that  scienti c  reason  fails  to  win  through  to  an 
adequate  grasp  of  spirit,  mind,  consciousness.   At  the  end  of  the  Logic,   the  Idea  goes 
outside  itself  in  the  form  of  nature.     The  Philosophy  of  Nature   then,  as  did  the 
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Phenomenology,   goes  through  a  discussion  of  inorganic  and  then  organic  nature--though 
a  much  more  detailed  and  lengthy  discussion.   After  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,   there  is  no 
reversal  of  the  sort  we  have  just  seen  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology.    Instead,  we 
pass  directly  on  in  the  Philosophy  of  Mind   to  spirit,  mind,  consciousness.   We  begin  with 
an  anthropology  of  the  soul,  proceed  through  phenomenology  and  psychology,  and  then 
move  on  to  law,  morality,  the  family,  civil  society,  and  the  state.   In  other  words--and 
Hegel  says  it  explicitly--nature  passes  over  to  spirit.    
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In  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,   God  is  taken  to  have  created  nature  and  thus  can  be 
revealed  both  in  nature  as  well  as  in  spirit.   In  this  text ,   reason's  quest  to   nd  itself  in 
nature  does  not  fail--it  does  not  end  up  with  a  mere  bone.   In  the  Philosophy  of  Nature, 
Hegel  says,  "Spirit   nds  in  Nature  its  own  essence  …  "   In  fact,  the  study  of  nature  allows 
spirit  to  be  liberated,  for  it  to  emerge  on  its  own,  and  to  be  studied  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Mind.    Nature  implicitly  is  reason,  but  it  is  through  spirit,  through  our  study  of  nature, 
that  reason   rst  emerges  from  nature  into  existence.     This  is  rather  obscure,  but  we  can 
40
at  least  see  that  in  Hegel's  view  nature  has  proceeded  from  spirit  and  spirit  will  re-emerge 
from  nature.     Thus,  spirit's  quest  to  know  itself  in  nature,  to   nd  itself  in  nature,  in  the 
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Encyclopaedia,   succeeds,  whereas  in  the  Phenomenology   it  failed.   
How  are  we  to  interpret  this  di erence?   Did  Hegel  change  his  mind  in  the 
Encyclopaedia?    In  the  Phenomenology,   the  goal  of  scienti c  reason  seemed  to  be  to 
deduce  mind  from  brain.   Phrenologists  observe  natural  objects,  skulls,  from  which  they 
infer  that  certain  bumps  were  produced  by  certain  brain  processes.   From  those  brain 
processes  they  then  make  the  leap  to  mind  and  infer  speci c  traits  of  character.   So  also 
psychologists  move  from  outer  circumstances  to  the  inner  individual--from  the  observed 
to  the  inferred,  the  natural  to  the  spiritual.   In  the  Phenomenology,   Hegel  rejects  this 
whole  procedure,  a  procedure  that  appears  especially  absurd  in  phrenology,  but  which  he 
 nds  objectionable  in  general.   Has  Hegel  changed  his  mind  in  the  Encyclopaedia?    Has 
he  come  to  think  we  can   leap  from  brain  to  mind,  from  nature  to  spirit?  
37    PhS,   209  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  191. 
38    L,   379  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  452.   
39    Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Nature   (hereafter  PN  ),  trans.  A.V.  Miller  (Oxford: 
Clarendon  Press,  1970),  443  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   IX,  719. 
40    PN,   13  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   IX,  48. 
41    PN,   444-45  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   IX,  721. 
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Or  perhaps  there  is  no  ultimate  disagreement  between  the  Phenomenology   and  the 
Encyclopaedia.    Perhaps,  in  the  Phenomenology   Hegel  is  just  out  to  attack  the 
positivistic  and  reductive  science  of  his  age,  a  science  that  is  shown  to  be  objectionable 
by  its  inability  to  win  through  to  mind.   But  if--taking  a  hint  from  Goethe  and 
Schelling--science  were  reconceived,  perhaps  then  it  could   win  its  way  through  to  spirit, 
as  it  does  in  the  Encyclopaedia.    And  so,  it  might  be  argued,  there  is  no  fundamental 
opposition  between  the  Phenomenology   and  the  Encyclopaedia;   it  is  just  that  in  the 
former  text  Hegel  attacks  the  science  he  objects  to  in  preparation  for  the  latter  text  where 
he  will  consider  a  reconceived  science  and  set  out  his  own  positive  views. 
At  the  stage  of  the  Phenomenology   at  which  we  examine  scienti c  reason,  we  have 
not  yet  arrived  at  the  absolute.   We  who  are  philosophizing  with  Hegel  know  that  we 
construct  nature,  though  scienti c  reason  will  not  accept  this.     For  scienti c  reason, 
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nature  is  something  real,  independent,  there,  outside  us.   Once  we  arrive  at  the 
absolute--as  we  certainly  have  by  the  time  of  the  Encyclopaedia--  we  will  see  nature  as 
completely  inside,  perfectly  ideal,  completely  constructed.   Is  the  Encyclopaedia   more 
radically  constructionist  and  idealist  than  the  Phenomenology?    Or  is  it  just  that  the 
Phenomenology   takes  up  reason  at  a  much  earlier  stage,  a  stage  which  refuses  to  accept 
that  it  constructs  and  idealizes  nature,  whereas  the  Encyclopaedia   takes  up  reason  at  a 
much  later  and  higher  level  of  its  development  where  it  is  able  to  fully  accept  its 
constructionist  and  idealist  character?   
And  when  we   nally  arrive  at  the  absolute,  does  Hegel  want  us  to  decide  that  the 
attitude  of  scienti c  reason,  as  presented  in  the  Phenomenology,   was  the  wrong  attitude, 
an  attitude  to  be  abandoned  entirely,  so  that  we  come  to  see  that  nature  really  is 
constructed  all  the  way  down,  that  it  is  completely  idealized?   Or  is  there  anything  correct 
about  the  Phenomenology's   treatment  of  scienti c  reason,  anything  that  we  want  to  keep 
permanently?   Scienti c  reason  always  confronts  an  object--an  it.   It  has  a  limit.   It  cannot 
absorb  all  of  nature  into  itself.   It  fails  to  idealize  everything--and  thus  stands  as  an 
obstacle  to  solipsism.  
Is  this  really  something  we  want  to  dispense  with,  brush  aside,  consider  a  mistake? 
One  might  consider  it  a  rather  brilliant  response  to  Kant.   Hegel  does  not  need  to  appeal 
to  a  permanent  that  is  out  there  in  the  form  of  an  unknown  thing-in-itself.   Hegel  rejects 
any  appeal  to  such  an  outside.   We  must  shore  up  our  idealism  immanently.   The  view  of 
nature  that  Hegel  develops  in  the  Phenomenology   is  certainly  of  a  nature  that  it  is 
constructed  and  ideal,  but  at  the  very  same  time,  scienti c  reason  is  unable  to  accept  this 
fact  and  will  not  accept  it.   Scienti c  reason  cannot  succeed  in  pulling  all  of  nature  inside. 
Scienti c  reason--because  of  its  own   limitations--cannot  explain  all  of  nature,  cannot 
idealize  it  completely.   And  this  failure  permanently  blocks  any  implosion  into  solipsism. 
We  need  not  violate  our  idealism  by  trying  to  anchor  ourselves  in  an  outside 
thing-in-itself--as  for  Kant.   We  can  be  as  idealistic  as  we  wish.   Even  matter  is 
essentially  a  concept.   We  have  constructed  all  of  nature.   Does  this  head  toward 
solipsism?   No.   Because  reason--scienti c,  positivistic,  ordinary,  common 
reason--simply  is  incapable  of  getting  that  far.   Try  it.   Try  to  use  reason  to  understand  the 
42    Hegel  says  that  consciousness  has  forgotten  it;  PhS,   141  and  Gesammelte 
Werke,   IX,  133. 
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world.   You  will  reach  a  limit  that  you  cannot  get  around,  that  cannot  be  dissolved  into 
the  ideal.   And  when  you  turn  to  consciousness,  scienti c  reason  will  objectify  and  reify 
it.   You  will  end  up  with  a  bone. 
The  sort  of  reason  that  Hegel  focuses  on  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology   is  an  as 
yet  undeveloped,  unconsummated,  lower  form  of  reason.     In  the  Introduction  to  the 
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Philosophy  of  History,   Hegel  distinguishes  between  two  forms  of  reason, 
 
the  Greek  Anaxagoras  was  the   rst  to  declare  that  the  world  is  governed  by  a 
'nous',   i.e.  by  reason  or  understanding  in  general.   This  does  not  signify  an 
intelligence  in  the  sense  of  a  self-conscious  reason  or  a  spirit  as  such,  and  the  two 
must  not  be  confused.   The  movement  of  the  solar  system  is  governed  by 
unalterable  laws;  these  laws  are  its  inherent  reason.   But  neither  the  sun  nor  the 
planets  which  revolve  around  it  in  accordance  with  these  laws  are  conscious  of 
them.   
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Indeed,  when  Socrates  read  Anaxagoras,  Hegel  points  out,  Socrates  was  disappointed 
to  discover  that  Anaxagoras  dealt  only  with  external  causes  such  as  air,  ether,  water,  and 
so  forth,  not  with  any  deeper  sort  of  reason.   Hegel  goes  on  to  suggest  that  to  get  at  the 
deeper  sort  of  reason  that  rules  the  world  we  might  might  start  by  examining  our  ordinary 
concept  of  providence.   
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In  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology,   the  sort  of  reason  that  is  presented  and 
examined  is  nous ,  but  a  higher  sort  of  reason--or  spirit--is  there  lurking  behind  the 
surface,  and  we  can  even  get  a  hint  of  it  from  the  way  nous   behaves--a  behavior  that 
contradicts  itself.   Nous   claims  to  study  independent,  external  objects  that  remain  there 
before  it  in  the  world,  but  without  realizing  what  it  is  doing  or  what  it  means,  nous 
idealizes--it  transforms  sensuous  objects  into  concepts.   
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The  characteristics  of  nous   are  that  it  takes  objects  to  be  things  that  present 
themselves  to  observation  as  found,  given--they  merely  are.     They  exist  in  the  form  of 
47
immediate  being.     They  are  outside,  external,  and  they  su er  passively  whatever  action 
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the  mind  performs  on  them.     Reason  as  nous    ts  things  into   xed  categories  and  denies 
49
them  all  opposite  or  opposed  categories.   Then  it  merely  strings  such  predicates  together
50
--it  connects  them  as  external  relations.   It  even  sees  the  mind  as  made  up  of  faculties, 
43    PhS,   146  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  138. 
44    Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  World  History:   Introduction   (hereafter  PWHI  ), 
trans.  H.B.  Nisbet  (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press,  1975),  34  and,  for  the 
German,  Vorlesungen  über  die  Philosophy  der  Weltgeschichte   (hereafter  PW,   I  ),  ed.  J. 
Ho meister  (Hamburg:   Felix  Meiner,  1955),  I,  37. 
45    PWHI,   34-5  and  PW,   I,  37-8. 
46    PhS,   147  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  138. 
47    PhS,   181  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  167. 
48    PhS,   146  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  138. 
49    PM,   13  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  27-8. 
50    L,   62-3,  37  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   VIII,  101-2,  73-4. 
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inclinations,  passions,  heterogeneous  beings,  as  if  they  were  inert  things  in  a  bag.     And, 
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as  Hegel  puts  it,  "When  being  as  such,  or  thingness,  is  predicated  of  the  mind,  the  true 
and  genuine  expression  for  this  is,  therefore,  that  mind  is  such  an  entity  as  a  bone  is.…we 
do  not  mean   it  …  but  that  is  what  we  say  …  "    
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Nous,   scienti c  reason,  Kantian  theoretical  reason,  which  claims  to  rule  the  world, 
and  which  sets  out  to   nd  itself  in  the  world,  is  doomed  to  failure.   It  limits  itself  to 
observation,  experience,  the  phenomenal,  and  thus  it  will  not  even  be  able  to  understand 
itself--it  will  turn  mind  into  a  bone.   If,  on  the  other  hand,  this  sort  of  reason  tries  to  go 
beyond  experience,  it  will  be  denounced  as  transcendental  illusion.   Hegel  would  suggest 
that  the  illusion  lies  instead  in  scienti c  reason's  belief  that  it  can  rule  the  world  when  it 
cannot  even  see  that  it  does  not  understand  itself. 
If  nature  is  the  realm  of  nous ,   of  scienti c  reason,  then  history  and  culture  are  the 
realm  of  spirit--the  realm  of  art,  religion,  and  philosophy.   Nous   cannot   nally  overcome 
the  otherness  of  the  object,  cannot  completely  idealize  it,  always  meets  a  limit,  and  when 
it  turns  to  mind,  even  reduces  it  to  a  bone.   Spirit  is  di erent.   Art,  religion,  and 
philosophy  are  able  to  overcome  otherness  and  objecti cation.   Reason  in  culture  is  able 
to  see  that  it  has  constructed  reality,  to  see  itself  in  that  reality,  and  to  be  fully  at  home 
with  itself.   In   culture,  all  is  the  doing,  the  action,  the  construction  of  self-consciousness. 
What,  for  example,  is  a  government?   It  is  certainly  not  a  set  of  buildings  or  even  persons. 
It  is  not  a  thing--like  a  bone.   It  is  a  set  of  beliefs,  commitments,  actions,  practices, 
procedures,  ideas,  laws,  and  so  forth.   It  is  our  construction--all  the  way  down. 
It  is  true  that  nature,  for  Hegel,  is  constructed  by  us  just  as  much  as  culture  is. 
Nevertheless,  in  nature  there  is  always  something  there  that  remains  an  other,  over  against 
us,  an  it,  that  we  cannot  dissolve.   Nous   fails  in  its  attempt  to   nd  itself  adequately  in 
nature.   Spirit  does  not  have  this  problem  in  culture.   Culture  is  the  realm  in  which  reason 
can   nd  itself  and  be  at  home  with  itself  in  the  world.   If  anything,  spirit  has  the  opposite 
problem.   If  we  too  quickly  see  that  culture  is  our  construction,  it  can  lose  its  reality  for 
us.   If  we  too  quickly  see  that  we  have  constructed  God,  religion  can  collapse.   If  we  too 
quickly  see  that  government  is  nothing  but  the  practices  and  beliefs  of  individual 
citizens--perhaps  especially  of  certain  classes  of  those  citizens--government  can  collapse. 
In  short,  where  we  could  not  get  around  nature's  objectivity  and  otherness,  cultural 
institutions  can  be  in  need  of  a  certain  degree  of  objectivity  and  otherness.   They  will 
have  to  generate  this  objectivity--through  the  trappings  of  monarchy,  clerical  ritual,  or 
something  of  the  sort.   If  we  saw  all  at  once  that  we  had  constructed  God,  nature,  and  our 
world,  we  would  collapse  into  a  chaotic  solipsism.   Our  constructions  must  have  the  form 
51    PhS,   182  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  169. 
52    I  prefer  Baillie's  translation  of  this  passage:  see  Phenomenology  of  Mind 
(hereafter  PhM  ),  trans.  J.B.  Baillie  (New  York:   Harper  &  Row,  1967),  369  (Hegel's 
italics)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  190;  for  Miller's  translation,  see  PhS,   208.   Hegel 
also  says,  "Nature  is  only  the  corpse  of  the  Understanding  …  Schelling  therefore  called 
her  a  petri ed  intelligence  …  "  ( PN,   14-15  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   IX,  50-1.)   Once  we 
reach  the  perspective  of  spirit,  it  is  true,  the  corpse  can  be  revived;  but  not  if  we  remain  at 
the  perspective  of  the  corpse. 
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of  objecti cations.   They  must  take  on  the  look  of  otherness.   They  must  be  a  bit  alien  if 
we  are  to  have  a  solid  world.  
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To  better  understand  spirit,  as  opposed  to  nous,   let  us  look  at  the  Philosophy  of  Mind, 
where  Hegel  speaks  of: 
  
the  mind  or  spirit  that  makes  world-history.   In  this  case,  there  no  longer  stands, 
on  the  one  side,  an  activity  external  to  the  object,  and  on  the  other  side,  a  merely 
passive  object:   but  the  spiritual  activity  is  directed  to  an  object  which  is  active  in 
itself,  an  object  which  has  spontaneously  worked  itself  up  into  the  result  to  be 
brought  about  by  that  activity  …  Thus,  for  example,  the  people  and  the  time 
which  were  molded  by  the  activity  of  Alexander  and  Caesar  as  their   object,  on 
their  own  part,  quali ed  themselves  for  the  deeds  to  be  performed  by  these 
individuals;  it  is  no  less  true  that  the  time  created  these  men  as  that  it  was  created 
by  them;  they  were  as  much  the  instrument  of  the  mind  or  spirit  of  their  time  and 
their  people,  as  conversely,  their  people  served  these  heroes  as  an  instrument  for 
the  accomplishment  of  their  deeds.   
54
 
It  will  be  instructive  to  compare  this  passage  with  our  discussion  a  few  pages  back  of 
empirical  psychology.   Empirical  psychology,  in  Hegel's  view,  attempts  to  give  us  laws 
that  would  determine  the  relationship  of  circumstances  to  mind.   But  it  completely  fails 
because  individuals  both  conform  to,  as  well  as  set  themselves  in  opposition  to  (and  even 
transform),  circumstances.   What  happens,  then,  depends  as  much  upon  the  individuals  as 
the  circumstances.   There  is  a  complex  interplay  between  the  two  that  cannot  be 
determined  as  a  law.   The  people,  the  circumstances  of  their  time,  and  leaders  like  Caesar 
or  Alexander  shape  and  in uence  each  other  in  mutually  determining  ways  that  scienti c 
reason  cannot   x.   Nous   is  at  a  loss  in  this  realm.   If  it  tries  to  move  ahead  anyway,  it  will 
move  into  pseudoscience.   On  the  other  hand,  the  historian,  the  artist,  the  theologian,  the 
political  theorist,  the  philosopher  are  quite  at  home  with  such  cultural  phenomena  and  can 
handle  them  without  special  problems.   Indeed,  their  doing  so  even  contributes  to  the 
further  development  and  articulation  of  spirit.   It  is  a  signi cant  part  of  the  process  by 
which  spirit  constructs  itself,  grasps  itself,  and  comes  to  be  at  home  with  itself.   Through 
such  activity  spirit  constructs  its  world,   lls  it  out,  and  roots  us  in  it. 
What  scienti c  reason  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology   focuses  on  is  nous; 
whereas  the  Encyclopaedia   also  considers  spirit.   Scienti c  reason  in  Chapter  V  of  the 
Phenomenology   supposes  that  nature  is  prius   and  that  mind  is  posited  by  nature.   What 
the  Encyclopaedia   sees  is  that  spirit  is  prius   and  that  nature  is  posited  by  spirit.     Many 
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of  the  di erences  between  these  two  texts  stem  from  the  fact  that  the  Phenomenology   is 
out  to  establish  the  absolute,  whereas  the  Encyclopaedia   assumes  that  that  has  been 
successfully  accomplished  and  operates  entirely  within  the  absolute.   Thus,  the 
Encyclopaedia   sorts  through  each  of  the  absolute's  parts,  putting  them  in  place,  and 
becomes  increasingly  aware  of  the  totality  of  the  whole  as  well  as  the  internal  relations 
53    PhS,   206  (Hegel's  italics)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  189. 
54    PM,   13  (Hegel's  italics)  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  28. 
55    PM,   14  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  29. 
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among  the  parts.   In  the  Phenomenology,   on  the  other  hand,  we  are  going  through  the 
same  parts,  but  not  yet  having  reached  the  absolute,  which  we  are  working  to  prove,  we 
 nd  that  each  stage  resists  us.   Each  stage  tries  to  put  itself  forth  as  fully  adequate--as  a 
su cient  alternative  to  the  absolute.   Each  presents  itself  in  isolation--as  externally 
related  and  resisting  totality.   Each  stage  claims  we  need  go  no  further--that  it  is  capable 
of  explaining  all  of  our  experience.   So  the  parts  which  are  seen  as  making  up  an 
internally  related  totality  in  the  Encyclopaedia    each  step  forth  on  their  own  in  the 
Phenomenology,   each  solitary  stage  fails  to  explain  all  of  our  experience,  and  that  is  what 
drives  us  further  along  toward  the  absolute  and  thus  the  possibility  of  the  Encyclopaedia. 
In  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology,   Hegel  tries  to  present  and  to  push  as  far  as  it  will 
go:   empiricism,  observation,  isolation,  in  order  to  show  that  nous   will  not  work  and  to 
force  us  to  reverse  ourselves.   In  the  Encyclopaedia ,   on  the  other  hand,  he  is  trying  to 
elaborate  connection  and  totality.   Where  the  Phenomenology   is  a  pathway  of  doubt,  a 
way  of  despair,    with  each  stage  failing  to  hold  up,  the  Encyclopaedia   continually 
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presents  positive  claims  and  establishes  philosophical  positions.   
The  Encyclopaedia,   especially  the  Philosophy  of  Nature,   examines  empirical 
science,  and  it  asks  where  it   ts  and  what  it  means  within  the  totality  of  the  absolute. 
Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology   takes  up  empirical  science  and  asks  whether  it  can 
stand  on  its  own  and  either  replace  or  make  unnecessary  the  absolute;  Hegel  does  this  in 
order  to  convince  us  that  we  need  the  absolute  and  that  it  cannot  be  replaced  or  eliminated 
by  natural  science.   In  this  sense,  then,  the  Phenomenology   is  false  and  the 
Encyclopaedia   is  true.   The  Encyclopaedia   correctly  sees  the  relationship  of  parts  to  the 
whole,  and  the  Phenomenology,   as  it  presents  those  parts  in  isolation,  presents  them 
falsely.   On  the  other  hand,  the  way  the  Phenomenology   presents  these  parts,  each 
claiming  to  stand  alone  and  be  self-su cient,  corresponds  to  ordinary  consciousness  as 
well  as  to  the  traditional  claims  of  various  philosophical  systems  and  of  natural  science. 
This  involves  illusion,  in  Hegel's  view,  but  it  is  a  necessary  illusion--as  transcendental 
illusion  is  necessary  for  Kant.   It  gives  us  a  solid  world  and  anchors  our  idealism  without 
violating  that  idealism  by  appeal  to  some  permanent  outside. 
But  things  are  even  more  complicated  than  this.   The  Phenomenology   establishes  the 
absolute,  from  which  the  Encyclopaedia   as  well  as  other  texts  like  the  Philosophy  of 
History,   the  Philosophy  of  Right,   and  the  Aesthetics   take  o .   But  it  is  not  as  if  the 
Phenomenology   just  deduces  a  principle  with  which  the  other  texts  start.   The 
Phenomenology   in  establishing  the  absolute,  gives  us  the  totality  of  all  reality  within 
which  we  exist,  have  consciousness,  and  know  all  that  we  know.   The  Encyclopaedia   as 
well  as  all  of  the  other  texts  take  place  within  this  absolute  that  the  Phenomenology 
establishes.   If,  then,  the  Phenomenology   is  correct  in  its  proof  of  the  absolute,  nothing 
exists  outside  the  absolute--not  even  the  Phenomenology   itself .   So  the  di erence 
between  the  Phenomenology   and  the  Encyclopaedia   is  not  as  sharp  as  it  might  seem. 
The  stages  of  the  Phenomenology   abstract  from  the  absolute,  present  themselves  as  if 
they  can  stand  alone,  in  order  to  show  us  that  they  cannot  do  so,  and  thus  drive  us  on 
56    PhS,   49-50  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  56.   For  a  more  extended  discussion  of 
the  approach  of  the  Phenomenology,   see  my  "Structure  and  Method  of  Hegel's 
Phenomenology,"   forthcoming  in  CLIO. 
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toward  the  absolute.   Both  texts  operate  fully  within  the  absolute.   It  is  just  that  the 
Encyclopaedia   is  fully  aware  of  this,  straightforwardly  acknowledges  it,  and  proceeds 
accordingly,  whereas  the  stages  of  the  Phenomenology,   while  they  try  to  act  as  if  they  are 
independent  of  the  absolute  or  that  there  is  no  absolute,  are  set  out  that  way  only  in  order 
to  prove  to  us  the  absolute  that  surrounds  us. 
In  an  interesting  passage  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology,   Hegel  says  that  if 
consciousness  "knew  that  Reason   is  equally  the  essence  of  things  and  of  consciousness 
itself,  and  that  it  is  only  in  consciousness  that  Reason  can  be  present  in  its  own  proper 
shape,  it  would  go  down  into  the  depths  of  its  own  being,  and  seek  Reason  there  rather 
than  in  things.   If  it  did   nd  it  there,  it  would  be  directed  to  the  actual  world  outside 
again,  in  order  to  behold  therein  Reason's  sensuous  expression,  but  at  the  same  time  take 
it  essentially  as  [concept]."     In  Hyppolite's  view  this  passage  describes  precisely  what 
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Hegel  does  in  the  Logic,   but  not  in  the  Phenomenology.    Hyppolite  thinks  that  such  a 
consciousness  transcends  the  Phenomenology.    It  is  no  longer  a  phenomenological 
consciousness  but  an  ontological  consciousness.    
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What  then  are  we  to  conclude  about  the  relation  of  the  Phenomenology   to  the 
Encyclopaedia?    Is  it  the  case  that  once  we  reach  spirit  we  will  see  that  all  is  constructed, 
including  nature?   And  will  it  be  the  case  that  all  is  within  the  unity  of  absolute 
consciousness  such  that  we  will  be  able  to  freely  deduce  mind  from  brain  and  spirit  from 
nature?   And  if  this  is  so,  then  must  we  say  that  there  is  a  fundamental  di erence,  a  shift, 
in  Hegel's  thought  between  the  Phenomenology   and  the  Encyclopaedia?    Because  in  the 
Phenomenology   it  would  seem  that  Hegel  is  not  as  radical  a  constructionist  or  idealist  as 
he  is  in  the  Encyclopaedia.    In  the  Phenomenology,   nature  does  not  seem  to  be 
constructed  all  the  way  down.   There  remains  a  bare  it,  an  other,  that  cannot  be  absorbed, 
pulled  into  reason,  so  that  we  can  adequately  grasp  spirit.   And  so  consciousness  remains 
phenomenological;  it  does  not  fully  grasp  and  completely  construct  reality--it  does  not 
become  ontological.   
But  this  suggests  that  the  Encyclopaedia   casts  aside  the  view  of  the  Phenomenology 
and  succeeds  where  it  failed.   This  is  simply  not  correct.   In  the   rst  place,  we  certainly 
cannot  say  that  the  Encyclopaedia   succeeds  in  'deducing  mind  from  brain.'   That  very 
way  of  phrasing  the  issue  is  based  upon  a  positivistic,  reductionist,  and  scientistic 
outlook--the  outlook  of  nous.    The  Encyclopaedia   will  move  back  and  forth  between 
spirit  and  nature,  mind  and  brain,  have  interesting  things  to  say  about  them,   nd 
insightful  connections,  and  so  forth,  but  it  will  not  even  try  to  'deduce   mind  from  brain.' 
It  will  instead  do  the  sorts  of  things  humanistic  disciplines  like  philosophy  do.   In  other 
words,  it  is  much  as  we  saw  was  the  case  in  comparing  empirical  psychology  with 
cultural  history.   The  fact  that  psychology  failed  to  give  us  the  laws  that  determine  the 
way  circumstances  in uence  mental  life  is  not  intended  to  suggest  that  spirit  will  succeed 
in  the  same  positivistic  endeavor.   Rather  history,  philosophy,  art,  and  other  humanistic 
disciplines  will  operate  in  their  own  mode  in  handling  the  way  in  which  circumstances, 
people,  and  leaders  like  Caesar  or  Alexander  mutually  in uence  each  other.   Spirit  does 
57    PhS,   146  (Hegel's  italics;  and  translation  altered)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX, 
138. 
58    Hyppolite,  235. 
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not  try  to  be  a  superscience  (which  would  inevitably  end  up  being  a  pseudoscience).   It 
has  its  own  di erent  way  of  dealing  with  the  world.   
What,  then,  is  the  attitude  Hegel   nally  wants  us  to  adopt  toward  nature?   Does  he 
want  us  to  move  beyond  scienti c  reason  and  to   nally  see  that  nature  is  fully  a  part  of 
spirit  and  that  it  is  constructed  all  the  way  down?   Does  he  want  us   nally  to  reject  the 
view  of  the  Phenomenology   which  suggests  that  nature  always  involves  an  it,  an  object 
that  resists  and  cannot  be  totally  idealized,  that  cannot  be  completely  dissolved  into 
consciousness?   Should  we  dismiss  this  view?  
I  do  not  think  so.   In  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,   Hegel  says,  "every  determinateness  is  a 
determinateness  only  counter  to  another  determinateness;  to  that  of  mind  in  general  is 
opposed,  in  the   rst  instance,  that  of  Nature  …  Nature,  not  merely  o ers  resistance  to  us, 
exists  apart  from  our  mind,  but  holds  itself  asunder  against  its  own  self,  divides  itself  into 
concrete  points,  into  material  atoms,  of  which  it  is  composed."     Nature  is  a  necessary 
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anchor  to  mind.   If  mind  were  able  to   nd  itself  instantly  in  everything  before  it,  if  it 
could   nd  itself  perfectly  and  completely  in  the  world,  if  all  was  a  perfect  mirror,  or  if  it 
never  even  had  to  look  outside  but  only  inside,  mind,  I  suspect,  would  collapse  into  a 
disordered  solipsistic  madness.   Kant  argued  that  we  need  a  permanent  against  which  to 
measure  change.   For  Hegel  we  need  to  meet  resistance.    And  if  we  are  to  be  consistent 
idealists,  this  resistance  cannot  come  from  outside.   There  is  no  transcendent  God  or 
unknown  thing-in-itself  that  we  can  call  to  our  aid.   Everything  is  immanent.   Thus,  it  is 
only  theoretical  reason  itself  that  can  generate  this  resistance.   Scienti c  reason,  which 
limits  itself  to  empirical  observation,  itself  gives  us  solid  objects  and  things.   They  are 
part  of  spirit--within  the  absolute.   They  are  not  unknown  things-in-themselves  or 
Fichtean  impacts.   But  we  cannot  dissolve  them  into  consciousness.   They  remain  as  an 
object--a  bone.   Of  course,  we  can  move  beyond  scienti c  reason  to  spirit  where  we  will 
see  that  everything  is  constructed  by  spirit  all  the  way  down,  but  it  is  questionable 
whether  we  could  live  in  that  realm  alone,   whether  we  could  keep  our  footing.   We  need 
scienti c  reason,  ordinary  reason,  which,  illusory  as  it  is  from  a  higher  perspective,  gives 
us  the  solid  anchored  world  of  objects  we  need  to  live  in. 
Reason's  very  failure  to   nd  itself  in  the  object,  to  idealize  the  object  completely,  to 
win  through  to  spirit,  is  its  success  for  ordinary  consciousness.   The  failure  of  reason  to 
absorb  all  into  consciousness  cuts  o   and  makes  impossible  an  implosion  into  solipsism. 
Solipsism  is  impossible  if  the  tendency  of  theoretical  reason  is  to  objectify--to  take  mind 
to  be  a  bone.   Thus,  for  Hegel,  we  end  up  with  a  subtle,  nuanced,  and  robust  idealism. 
Hegel  does  not  and  need  not  deny  the  external  world  or  insist  that  only  ideas  exist,  as  for 
Berkeley.   Reason  faces  a  world  of  matter  and  material  processes  that  it  studies 
scienti cally.   Such  study  transforms,  idealizes,  the  world.   The  essence  of  the  world  is 
grasped  in  thought.   Esse  es  intelligi.    But  theoretical  reason  cannot  go  all  the  way.   Spirit 
will  be  able  to  do  so,  but  for  nous   there  always  remains  an  it  that  we  cannot  dissolve. 
Reason  cannot  grasp  itself  in  the  world  as  if  there  were  nothing  but  reason,  spirit,  mind, 
and  no  other,  no  object.   Nevertheless,  this  it,  this  object,  is  not  a  Kantian  unknown 
thing-in-itself.   Though  theoretical  reason  is  unwilling  to  accept  it,  we  know  that  we  have 
constructed  this  world.   We  have  constructed  the  object  and  the  object  is  known.   But 
59    PM,   8-9  (Hegel's  italics)  and  Sämtliche  Werke,   X,  20-1. 
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because  of  the  form  of  knowing  involved--theoretical  reason,  nous  --we  are  unable  to 
fully  comprehend,  fully  idealize,  the  object.   Scienti c  reason,  much  like  the  labor  of 
Hegel's  slave,  works  on  the  object  and  idealizes  it,  makes  it  an  object-for-consciousness. 
But,  at  the  same  time,  the  more  we  work  on  the  world,  the  more  we  objectify  it,  the  more 
we  will  meet  resistance  that  must  be  wrestled  with,  transformed,  struggled  with.   In  short, 
the  more  we  work  on  the  world,  the  more  we  try  to  idealize  it,  the  more  nature  will  be 
stimulated  to  resist  us  and  demonstrate  its  independence.  
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Idealism  has  been  given  a  bad  name  by  its  enemies.   And,  at  least,  we  must   ght 
against  silly  stereotypes  of  it.   Johnson  thought  he  could  refute  idealism  by  kicking  a 
stone  and  uttering,  "I  refute  Berkeley  thus."   Hegel  would  seem  to  turn  this  very  ploy 
against  him.   It  is  the  slave  and  the  scientist  who  stub  their  toes  against  nature  and  wrestle 
with  the  resistance  of  the  world.   But  far  from  refuting  idealism,  their  work  is  the  very 
thing  that  idealizes  the  world  while  giving  us  the  experience  of  solid  objects  in  it.   In 
experiencing  the  resistance  of  Johnson's  stone,  the  slave  and  the  scientist  might  have  said, 
"We  refute  Johnson   thus." 
Reason  anchors  idealism  not  only  by  giving  us  resistant  objects,  but  also  in  a  second 
way  that  we  must  begin  to  recognize.   Hegel  suggests  in  Chapter  V  of  the 
Phenomenology    that  reason  is  larger  than  the  ego.   Reason  is  "dimly  aware  of  itself  as  a 
profounder  essence  than  the  pure  'I'  is  …  "     In  seeking  reason  in  the  world,  we  have 
61
seen,  subjective  reason  seeks  to   nd  objective  reason  embedded  in  nature,  and  in  this 
quest  the  ego  will  become  aware  that  it  is  a  part  of  a  larger  rational  unity,  a  unity  that 
includes  all  egos  and  all  objects  in  the  world.   This  begins  to  make  clear  to  us  how  reality 
can  be  constructed  by  consciousness  yet  be  something  that  consciousness   nds  to  be 
objective.   The  world  is  objective  in  the  sense  that  it  is  an  object,  a  thing,  a  natural 
resistance,  but  also  in  the  sense  that  the  world  is  rational,  organized,  lawlike.   This  is  to 
say  that  as  subjective  reason   nds  itself,   nds  objective  reason,  in  the  world,  it   nds  an 
authority,  something  it  must  answer  to,  something  that  makes  legitimate  demands  upon  it. 
Reason  is  both  an  activity  of  consciousness  and  its  sovereign.   Consciousness  has 
constructed  the  world  and  reason  is  the  action  of  consciousness,  but  it  is  not  as  if 
consciousness,  certainly  not  individual  consciousness,  is  arbitrarily  in  control  here.   To 
become  aware  of  reason  in  the  world  is  to  become  aware  of  reason  as  a  regularity,  a  norm, 
an  authority  that  is  not  other  than  me  but  which  is  much  larger  than  me. 
To  anchor  idealism  immanently--so  that  we  need  not  appeal  to  an  outside  and  thus 
undermine  our  idealism--we  need  resistant  objects,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  theoretical 
reason  gives  us.   Secondly,  we  need  totality--the  absolute.   There  can  be  nothing  outside 
of  consciousness--no  outside  to  consciousness.   Individual  consciousness  cannot  give  us 
such  totality--an  absolute  consciousness  will  be  required.   Nature  is  a  construction,  but  it 
is  not  the  construction  of  individual  consciousness.   It  is  more  objective  than  that.   It  is 
the  construction  of  an  absolute  consciousness.   The  hint  in  Chapter  V  that  reason  is  larger 
than  individual  consciousness  and  an  authority  for  it  pushes  us  in  this  direction.   Thirdly, 
what  we  need  to  anchor  our  idealism  is  to  be  solidly  grounded  so  that  we  can  be  at  home 
in  our  world--we  need  the  recognition  of  our  world,  recognition  by  accepted  authority.   In 
60    PhS,   118  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  115. 
61    PhS,   146  (Hegel's  italics)  and  Gesammelte  Werke,   IX,  138. 
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Chapter  V,  we  get  a  world  that  is  recognized  by  science.   Where  does  science's  authority 
come  from?   The  same  as  any  government,  from  its  accomplishments,  its  objecti cations, 
the  excellence  of  its  laws,  its  ability  to  understand  the  world,  and  to  control  it. 
To  claim  that  nature  is  constructed,  it  might  seem,  would  be  to  displace  the  centrality 
of  science.   Since  nature  would  have  to  be  constructed  by  an  absolute  consciousness,  it 
might  seem  that  theology  would  become  central.   However,  Hegel  takes  both  science  and 
religion  to  be  cultural  products.   This  does  not  mean  that  science  and  religion  are  false. 
The  fact  that  God  is  constructed,  in  no  way  establishes  that  God  does  not  exist.     So  also 
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the  fact  that  science  is  a  cultural  product,  and  that  science  constructs  nature,  in  no  way 
suggests  that  what  science  discovers  about  nature  is  untrue.   Science  can  certainly  go 
awry  and  lapse  into  pseudoscience.   Science  also  has  an  imperialistic  tendency  to  claim 
all  truth  for  itself  and  to  exclude  the  sciences  of  spirit  (history,  art,  religion,  philosophy, 
and  so  forth),  a  view  which  is  certainly  rejected  by  Hegel,  but  none  of  this  means  that 
science  cannot  allow  us  to  really  understand  laws  of  nature--which  also  thereby  shores  up 
our  world.   
We  must  see  what  this  amounts  to.   Natural  science  is  not  sovereign,  and  the  spiritual 
sciences  marginally  important  underlaborers.   If  the  fundamental  task  of  idealism  is  to 
construct  the  world,  understand  it,  and  be  at  home  in  it,  science  certainly  has  an  important 
role  to  play  in  this  process.   Indeed,  it  is  the  hero  of  ordinary  consciousness.   But  its  role 
is  a  smaller  one  that  should  not  blind  us  to  the  larger  and  more  fundamental  role  of  the 
human  and  cultural  sciences.   If  we  want  to  understand  how  we  construct  the  world,  we 
must  look   nally  to  art,  religion,  philosophy,  and  history. 
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62    The  claim  that  God  is  constructed,  which  seems  obvious  to  non-believers  (of 
which  I  count  myself  one),  is  quite  objectionable  to  most  believers,  and  both  believers  as 
well  as  non-believers  usually  think  that  constructionism  implies  atheism.   That  is  a 
serious  mistake  that  will  make  it  impossible  for  us  to  understand  Hegel.   The  claim  that 
God  is  constructed  is  absolutely  neutral  with  respect  to  belief  or  disbelief--indeed,  is 
totally  irrelevant  to  the  question  of  God's  existence.   Even  the  believer  must  admit  that  for 
God  to  make  any  sense  to  human  beings,  God  must  be  constructed.   Each  culture  must 
 nd  the  language,  concepts,  practices,  and  institutions  that  make  their  God 
understandable  to  them.   This  is  true  even  if  the  believer  thinks  that  God  contributed  to  all 
of  this,  dictated  every  syllable,  comma,  and  period.   Hegel  is  certainly  a  believer  and  he 
does  not  intend  his  constructionism  to  be  at  odds  with  his  belief.   On  the  other  hand,  the 
non-believer  will   nd  constructionism  to  be  perfectly  compatible  with  disbelieve.   Yet,  to 
be  sensible,  the  non-believer  must  admit  that  any  culture,  in  a  very  signi cant  way,  is  a 
product  of  its  God--whether  or  not  God  exists.   Even  if  there  is  no  God,  the  religious 
language,  concepts,  values,  practices,  and  institutions  that  a  culture  has  developed  over 
time  will  react  back  upon  it,  deeply  in uence  it,  mold  it,  and  at  least  in  certain  ways  may 
well  bene t  this  culture,  improve  it,  do  it  good.   Moreover,  this  could  continue  to  occur 
long  after  the  last  believer. 
 
